Tag: Cybersecurity Assessment Tool

16 Jun 2022
E-Banking Booklet

FFIEC Cancels E-Banking Handbook

On May 13, 2022, the FFIEC very quietly rescinded the FFIEC Information Technology Examination Handbook (IT Handbook) booklet entitled E-Banking.  The original booklet was released in 2003 and was accompanied by a flurry of activity by financial institutions to come up with a separate E-banking policy and risk assessment.  In effect, the FFIEC is now declaring (admitting?) that these are no longer necessary because all the basic risk management principles that apply to E-Banking are already addressed in other Handbooks.  Operational risk is addressed in the Business Continuity Management Handbook, information security risk is addressed in the Information Security Handbook, cyber risk is assessed in the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool, and third-party risk is addressed here, here, and here

We agree with this approach, and have long held that separately addressing each new emerging or evolving technology was cumbersome, duplicative, and unnecessary.  In our opinion, shifting the focus of the handbooks to basic risk management principles and best practices that can apply to all business processes makes more sense and is long overdue. Could the Wholesale and Retail Payment Systems handbooks be phased out next?  How about the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool?  Since cybersecurity is simply a subset of information security more broadly, could we see a phase-out of a separate cyber assessment?  Or even better, could we see the Information Security Handbook include a standardized risks and controls questionnaire that includes cyber?

Admittedly this is only one less policy and one less risk assessment, but we’ll be watching this trend with great interest. Anything that can help ease the burden on overworked compliance folks is a welcome change!

13 Jun 2017
Banker looking over the CAT

FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool Update

The FFIEC recently released a long-awaited update to the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool, and we think overall it is a relatively minor but useful evolution. But before we get into the details of what the update does address, it’s important to note that it did not address the ambiguity issues that plague the current assessment. One example…in the Inherent Risk section, there are a plethora of semicolons. Are they supposed to be interpreted as “or” or “and”? Take the question about personal devices being allowed to connect to the corporate network (4th question in the Technologies and Connection Types category).

The minimal risk level states the following:

“Only one device type available; available to <5% of employees (staff, executives, managers); e-mail access only.”

If the semicolons are interpreted as “or,” the statement reads like this:

“Only one device type available OR available to <5% of employees (staff, executives, managers) OR e-mail access only”.

This is considerably different than:

“Only one device type available AND available to <5% of employees (staff, executives, managers) AND e-mail access only”.

Unfortunately, the update did not offer any clarification on this, and as a result we are left to guess what the regulator’s intentions are. Our approach has been to risk-rank each question segment individually. So in the example above, what is the greater risk? The number of device types, the number of employees using them, or what they are allowed to access? We rank the risk of what employees are allowed to access highest, followed by the number of employees accessing, followed by the device types. And this is just one example, 18 of the 39 inherent risk questions require this type of interpretive challenge, and correct interpretation is absolutely critical, because your gap analysis and subsequent cyber action plan depend on an accurate inherent risk assessment.

Appendix A

However, the FFIEC CAT update does impact 2 areas; the first is a more detailed cross-reference in Appendix A mapping the baseline statements to the 2 recently released IT Handbooks (Management and Information Security), and the second will give most FI’s more flexibility when evaluating declarative statements.

First, the changes to Appendix A. Compare the original Risk Management/Audit section…

Risk Management/Risk Assessment: The risk assessment is updated to address new technologies, products, services, and connections before deployment.

Source: IS.B.13: Risk assessments should be updated as new information affecting information security risks is identified (e.g., a new threat, vulnerability, adverse test result, hardware change, software change, or configuration change). IS.WP.I.3.3: Determine the adequacy of the risk assessment process.
* Information Security, E-Banking, Management, Wholesale Payments

…with the updated section:

Risk Management/Risk Assessment: The risk assessment is updated to address new technologies, products, services, and connections before deployment.

Source: IS.II.A: pg7: External events affecting IT and the institution’s ability to meet its operating objectives include natural disasters, cyber attacks, changes in market conditions, new competitors, new technologies, litigation, and new laws or regulations. These events pose risks and opportunities, and the institution should factor them into the risk identification process.

IS.II.C:pg11: Additionally, management should develop, maintain, and update a repository of cybersecurity threat and vulnerability information that may be used in conducting risk assessments and provide updates to senior management and the board on cyber risk trends.

IS.WP.8.3.d: Determine whether management has effective threat identification and assessment processes, including the following: Using threat knowledge to drive risk assessment and response.

This more detailed and expanded set of cross-refences will be useful for both institutions and consultants as they navigate their way through this interpretive minefield.

However, this could be the most significant change:

“The updated Assessment will also provide additional response options, allowing financial institution management to include supplementary or complementary behaviors, practices and processes that represent current practices of the institution in supporting its cybersecurity activity assessment.” (Emphasis added)

It took us a while to find how this one was implemented because we were looking for a whole new section, but all the FFIEC has done is add a third option to your response to the declarative statements in the Control Maturity section. Prior to this update, you could only answer either “Y” or “N”. Now there is a third option; “Y(C)”, or Yes with Compensating Controls:

CAT Yes/No Controls

The FFIEC defines a Compensating Control as:

“A management, operational, and/or technical control (e.g., safeguard or countermeasure) employed by an organization in lieu of a recommended security control in the low, moderate, or high baselines that provides equivalent or comparable protection for an information system.”

Essentially what this means is now institutions will be able to document adherence to a declarative statement using either direct off-set (primary) controls, or alternative compensating controls, IF they are able to properly identify them. Because these controls are “in lieu of” recommended controls, they are necessarily more difficult to identify and document, much more so than a primary control.

That said, having a way for institutions to document their adherence to a particular declarative statement using either direct or compensating controls is a significant improvement, and should ultimately result in more declarative statements being marked as achieved. Be careful though, although we haven’t seen any IT exams since the update, a “Y(C)” response may very well prompt additional regulatory scrutiny precisely because it requires more documentation.

Safe Systems has assisted almost 100 customers through the CAT so far, helping to document their responses, producing stakeholder reports, and crafting action plans. Let us know if we can help you.

21 Mar 2017
Late Night Exam Questions

Ask the Guru: How Can I Best Determine My Cyber Risk Profile?

Hey Guru!

We just completed the Cybersecurity Assessment, so now we have our current risk and control maturity levels identified.  Can we draw any conclusions about our average risk and control levels?  For example, most of our risks are in the Least and Minimal areas, but we do have a few Moderate as well.  Can we just average them and conclude that our overall cyber risk levels are minimal?


Towards the end of last year the FFIEC released a Frequently Asked Questions document about the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool, and item #6 directly addressed your question.  The Council stated that “…when a majority of activities, products, or services fall within the Moderate Risk Level, management may determine that the institution has a Moderate Inherent Risk Profile.”

This would seem to validate the approach of using the average1 of all risk levels to identify your overall risk level.  However, they go on to state that each risk category may pose a different level of risk. “Therefore, in addition to evaluating the number of times an institution selects a specific risk level, management may also consider evaluating whether the specific category poses additional risk that should be factored into the overall assessment of inherent risk.”  This would appear to directly contradict the averaging approach, indicating (correctly, in my opinion) that since all risks are NOT equal, you should NOT determine overall risk based on an average.

For example, let’s say that all of your risks in the Technologies and Connection Types category are in the Least and Minimal level except for Unsecured External Connections, which is at the Moderate level.  So you have 13 items no higher than minimal, and 1 item moderate.  Sounds like an overall minimal level of risk, right?  Except a Moderate level of risk for Unsecured External Connections indicates that you have several (6-10) unsecured connections.  As any IT auditor will tell you, even 1 unsecured connection can be a serious vulnerability!

So although the FFIEC says that “…you may determine…” you’re at one level if the majority of your responses fall within that level, they go on to say you really shouldn’t really draw that conclusion without additional evaluation.

This is just one of many examples of confusing, conflicting, and occasionally misleading elements in the CAT, and a very good reason to have assistance filling it out (shameless plug).

 

1 There are 3 primary ways of defining “average”; mean, mode and median.  If you’ve assigned 1-5 numeric values to the risk levels, we can define average as “mean”.  If we’re assuming average is “mode”, it’s simply the value that occurs most often.  This would appear the way the FFIEC is approaching it.  Regardless how you define “average”, it leads to the same (inaccurate) conclusion.

19 Oct 2016

Ask the Guru: “The Cybersecurity Assessment Tool… Do we have to?”

Hey Guru!

Management is asking why we have to complete the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool when it is voluntary. They feel it is too much work if it is not mandatory. I think it is still needed even though it is voluntary. Is there any documentation as to why it is still necessary for OCC banks to complete the Assessment?


 The FFIEC issued a press release October 17, 2016, on the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool titled Frequently Asked Questions. This reiterated that the assessment is voluntary and an institution can choose to use either this assessment tool, or an alternate framework, to evaluate inherent cybersecurity risk and control maturity.

Since the tool was originally released in 2015, all the regulatory agencies have announced plans to incorporate the assessment into their examination procedures:

  • OCC Bulletin 2015-31 states “The OCC will implement the Assessment as part of the bank examination process over time to benchmark and assess bank cybersecurity efforts. While use of the Assessment is optional for financial institutions, OCC examiners will use the Assessment to supplement exam work to gain a more complete understanding of an institution’s inherent risk, risk management practices, and controls related to cybersecurity.”
  • Federal Reserve SR 15-9 states “Beginning in late 2015 or early 2016, the Federal Reserve plans to utilize the assessment tool as part of our examination process when evaluating financial institutions’ cybersecurity preparedness in information technology and safety and soundness examinations and inspections.”
  • FDIC FIL-28-2015 states “FDIC examiners will discuss the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool with institution management during examinations to ensure awareness and assist with answers to any questions.”
  • NCUA states “FFIEC’s cybersecurity assessment tool is provided to help them assess their level of preparedness, and NCUA examiners will use the tool as a guide for assessing cybersecurity risks in credit unions. Credit unions may choose whatever approach they feel appropriate to conduct their individual assessments, but the assessment tool would still be a useful guide.”

Even though the FFIEC format is officially voluntary, the institution still has to evaluate inherent risk and cybersecurity preparedness in some way. Therefore, unless you already have a robust assessment program in place, we strongly encourage all institutions to adopt the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool format since this is what the examiners will use.

NOTE:  The FAQ also made it clear that the FFIEC does not intend to offer an automated version of the tool.  To address this, we have developed a full-featured cybersecurity service (RADAR) that includes an automated assessment, plus a gap analysis / action plan, cyber-incident response test, and several other components.

27 Sep 2016

FFIEC Rewrites the Information Security IT Examination Handbook

In the first update in over 10 years, the FFIEC just completely rewrote the definitive guidance on their expectations for managing information systems in financial institutions.  This was widely expected, as the IT world has changed considerably since 2006.

There is much to unpack in this new handbook, starting with what appears to be a new approach to managing information security risk. The original 2006 handbook put the risk assessment process up front, essentially conflating risk assessment with risk management.  But as I first mentioned almost 6 years ago, the risk assessment is only one step in risk management, and it’s not the first step.  Before risk can be assessed you must identify the assets to be protected and the threats and vulnerabilities to those assets.  Only then can you conduct a risk assessment.  The new guidance uses a more traditional approach to risk management, correctly placing risk assessment in the second slot:

  1. Risk Identification
  2. Risk Measurement (aka risk assessment)
  3. Risk Mitigation, and
  4. Risk Monitoring and Reporting

This is a good change, and it is also identical to the risk management structure in the 2015 Management Handbook.  Its also very consistent with the 4 phase process specified in the 2015 Business Continuity Handbook:

  1. Business Impact Analysis
  2. Risk Assessment
  3. Risk Management, and
  4. Risk Monitoring and Testing

Beyond that, here are a few additional observations (in no particular order):

More from Less:

  • The new handbook is about 40% shorter, consisting of 98 pages as contrasted with 138 in the 2006 handbook.

…HOWEVER…

  • The new guidance contains 412 references to the word “should”, as opposed to 341 references previously.  This is significant, because compliance folks know that every occurrence of the word “should” in the guidance, generally translates to the word “will” in your policies and procedures.  So the handbook is 40% shorter, but increases regulator expectations by 20%!

Cyber Focus:

  • “…because of the frequency and severity of cyber attacks, the institution should place an increasing focus on cybersecurity controls, a key component of information security.”  Cybersecurity is scattered throughout the new handbook, including an entire section.

Assess Yourself:

  • There are 17 separate references to “self-assessments”, increasing the importance of utilizing internal assessments to gauge the effectiveness of your risk management and control processes.

Take Your Own Medicine:

  • Technology Service Providers to financial institutions will be held to the same set of standards:
    • “Examiners should also use this booklet to evaluate the performance by third-party service providers, including technology service providers, of services on behalf of financial institutions.”

The Ripple Effect:

  • The impact of this guidance will likely be quite significant, and will be felt across all IT areas.  For example, the Control Maturity section of the  Cybersecurity Assessment Tool contains 98 references and hyperlinks to specific pages in the 2006 Handbook.  All of these are now invalid.  I’m sure we can expect an updated assessment tool  from the FFIEC at some point in the not-too-distant future.  (Which will also necessitate changes to certain online tools!)
  • The new FDIC IT Risk Examination procedures (InTREx) also contains several references to the IT Handbook, although they are not specific to any particular page.

Regarding InTREx, I was actually hoping that the new IT Handbook and the new FDIC exam procedures would be more closely coordinated, but perhaps that’s too much to ask at this point.  In any case, the similarity between the 3 recently released Handbooks indicates increased standardization, and I think that is a good thing.  We will continue to dissect this document and report observations as we find them.  In the meantime, don’t hesitate to reach out with your own observations.

13 Oct 2015

Ask the Guru: Cybersecurity “Risk Appetite”

Hey Guru
I saw multiple references to the term “risk appetite” in the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool.  What exactly is risk appetite, and how can I address this in my institution? They just released Management Handbook contains 10 new references to “risk appetite”, including a requirement that the Board  has defined the institution’s risk appetite and it’s risk tolerance levels.


There are 6 references to “risk appetite” in the FFIEC cybersecurity tool, and although it is not a new concept in risk management, this is a term I have not seen in regulatory guidance before outside of lending and credit practices.  Here are all references in context:

  • The institution has a cyber risk appetite statement approved by the board or an appropriate board committee.
  • The board or board committee approved cyber risk appetite statement is part of the enterprise-wide risk appetite statement.
  • The risk appetite is informed by the institution’s role in critical infrastructure.
  • The independent audit function regularly reviews management’s cyber risk appetite statement.
  • The independent audit function regularly reviews the institution’s cyber risk appetite statement in comparison to assessment results and incorporates gaps into the audit strategy.
  • Threat intelligence is viewed within the context of the institution’s risk profile and risk appetite to prioritize mitigating actions in anticipation of threats.

Risk tolerance is pretty well documented in current guidance, and although there are subtle differences between the terms, I see risk tolerance and risk appetite as largely synonymous for most institutions.  Here is a good working definition of risk appetite:

The amount of risk that an enterprise is willing to pursue and accept in order to achieve the goals and objectives of their strategic plan.

How should you address cybersecurity risk appetite?  You probably already have both inherent and residual risk assessed in your cybersecurity risk assessment, and have identified each as either “High”, “Medium”, or “Low”.  Risk “appetite” is simply a decision by management that the residual risk level is acceptable.  In other words, management is willing to accept the remaining risk as the cost of achieving its objectives.

For example, you’ve identified a vendor as having high inherent risk, and applied the necessary controls to reduce the risk as much as you can.  The remaining (residual) risk is deemed by management to be either acceptable or unacceptable based on their risk tolerance.  So if you use a “High”, “Medium” and “Low” designation for residual risk, a value of “Low” or even “Medium” can be deemed acceptable if it is within the risk appetite of the institution.

Establishing your risk appetite for cybersecurity can be accomplished using either a qualitative or quantitative approach.  A quantitative approach requires an analysis of specific financial loss connected to a cybersecurity event.  While this is a valid way to document risk, it can be a challenge for all but the largest institutions.

Most institutions prefer a qualitative approach, which uses a scale (i.e. 1 – 10, or H, M, and L) to rank the impact of a cyber event on reputation risk, strategic risk, regulatory/legal risk and/or operational risk.  Management can then determine the level of acceptable risk in each risk category.  For example, you may decide you have a very low (1-3) tolerance for risks in the reputation category, but you may be willing to accept a higher level (3-5) in the operational area.



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Once you’ve established your risk appetite, the easiest way to document it is to add a “Risk Appetite” column to your existing cybersecurity risk assessment (ideally just after “Residual Risk”), where you designate remaining risk as either acceptable or unacceptable.

You might also want to amend your Information Security Policy to add a risk appetite statement.  Something like this:

“The Board has established specific strategic goals and objectives as defined in its strategic plan.  To increase the probability of achieving these goals, the Board has established acceptable risk tolerances within its risk appetite.  The board periodically reviews the risk appetite and associated tolerances, and may adjust them to adapt to changing economic conditions and/or strategic goals.”